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Abstract. In this paper, we outline some potential conflicts that platform 
owners and software developers face in mobile application markets. Our 
arguments are based on comments captured in specialized online discussion 
forums, in which developers gather to share knowledge and experiences. The 
key findings indicate conflicts of interests, including 1) intra-platform 
competition, 2) discriminative promotion, 3) entry prevention, 4) restricted 
monetization, 5) restricted knowledge sharing, 6) substitution, and 7) strategic 
technology selection. Opportunistic platform owners may use their power to 
discriminate between third-part software developers. However, there are also 
potential strategic solutions that developers can apply; for example 
diversification (multi-homing), syndication and brand building.   
Keywords: Platform, Ecosystem, Technological Strategy, Software 
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1   Introduction 
Although the rise of mobile application markets is a fairly recent phenomenon, using 
platforms1 for distributing software, however, is not a new idea. For example, Linux 
has since long incorporated a centralized “market” for distributing software, while 
also introducing the one-click launch of applications. In addition to distribution2, 
application-platforms enable developers to monetize their offerings and capture new 
customers. Therefore, developers can delegate to the platform owner critical business 
functions while concentrating on development – a benefit often appreciated by 
technology-focused founders. 
Platforms are associated with network effects [1]: the more consumers a platform 
accumulates, the more feasible it is for developers to join, and vice versa. Because 
                                                        
 1  'Platform' is used in this paper to refer to commercial platforms, consisting of a 
platform owner and participants. A similar term is ‘ecosystem’, used in some fraction of 
literature; furthermore, the commercial perspective differentiates our approach from the 
fraction of IS research dealing with technological structure / infrastructure of a platform. 
Hence, our use of the term is close to ‘marketplace’. 
 2  Including transaction fees, bandwith costs, etc. 
reaching a critical mass either side is costly, the platform owners require resources. 
Therefore, platforms compete fiercely against one another, and the winners achieve 
high returns. Due to the fast-growing mobile application industry, this paper is highly 
topical. Its developer perspective sheds light to how developers perceive platforms as 
partners. For platform owners interested in improving their attractiveness among 
developers, this information is crucial. As demonstrated by Nokia’s failed effort with 
the Symbian/Meego platform, strategic choices in regards to the ecosystem matter to 
great extent. Although Nokia invested $250 million to the Symbian OS ownership, it 
was unable to increase the performance of the platform, thereby losing many 
developers and “killer apps” that attract end-users [2]. This forced the company to 
form a strategic alliance with Microsoft, simultaneously losing all future platform 
owner returns. Finally, awareness of potential conflicts of interests is useful for 
developers deciding whether or not to join a platform; or to form alliances to 
counterbalance the dominant position of the platform owner. 
2 Mobile Application Platforms: A Review 
Pioneered by Nokia’s Ovi Store, the history of mobile application marketplaces 
consists of several market makers. This study will focus on three major platforms, 
namely Apple’s App Store, Google Play, and Microsoft’s Windows Marketplace – 
inarguably, there are more, such as RIM’s BlackBerry and Samsung’s Bada, but the 
market is likely to stabilize in oligopoly. For a detailed history of mobile application 
market development, see [3]. Table 1 exhibits details of the three major mobile 
application platforms. 
Table 1.  Comparison of the three major mobile application platforms 
 App store  Google play Windows 
Marketplace 
Launch year 2008 2012 2009 
Application base 650K 450K 70K 
Developer base  215K N/A N/A 
User base (devices) 218M 396M 11M 
Downloads 26B 14B N/A 
Revenue-sharing 
(%) 
70-30 70-30 70-30 
Entry fees $99/year one-time $25 one-time $99 
In-platform 
marketing tools 
Rankings + 
Featured apps 
Rankings + 
Staff picks 
Rankings + 
Spotlight 
 
A recent survey [4] discovered that developers find the installed user base the most 
important factor of choosing a platform. Interestingly, this surpassed revenue 
potential which was ranked only as fourth important factor. Furthermore, low 
development costs were ranked above revenue potential. In terms of economic 
rationality, developers could be expected to report the inverse; that the revenue 
potential is more than investments, especially considering that they are relatively low 
and differ a lot less than revenue potential. The explanation could be found in 
risk/loss aversion, or lack of even minimal funds. Further, it was discovered that 
developers would appreciate promotional tools which now, as revealed in the last row 
of Table 1, are largely missing. 
Not only by their popularity among demand-side participants, have platforms also 
varied by their degree of openness. According to [5], a platform is open when its 1) 
development, commercialization, or use is not restricted, and 2) restrictions which 
exist to secure conformity (e.g. technical standards) are non-discriminatory, meaning 
that they apply uniformly to all participants, and reasonable. According to this strict 
definition, none of the three mobile application markets are open, but their degree of 
openness varies. More specifically, Table 2 examines their degree of openness by 
replicating the descriptive analysis done by [5]. Whereas they were focused on 
various operating systems, namely Linux, Windows, Macintosh, and iPhone, our 
analysis is on the three mobile application platforms. 
Table 2. Elements of openness and closeness  in mobile application platforms 
 App store  Google play Windows 
marketplac 
Demand-side user 
(end user) 
Closed Closed Closed 
Supply-side user 
(developer) 
Open Open Open 
Platform provider  
(Hardware/OS) 
Closed Open Open 
Platform sponsor 
(Design & IPR)  
Closed Open Closed 
 
For example, entry to applications market is controlled strongly by Apple, whereas 
Google is more liberal in accepting new applications. Further, access to the mobile 
device’s capabilities and/or features may be restricted; development platform cannot 
be augmented e.g. by developing extra tools, and so on. Demand-side is closed 
because platforms are mutually exclusive and no interoperability exists; one cannot 
use Android applications with iPhone, but is “locked in”. Access to a platform is 
granted given that the consumer purchases a certified device. This requirement is the 
strictest in the case of App Store, which not only is accessible only through Apple-
manufactured devices but requires the user to commit his/her credit card number prior 
to participating. Developer lock-in is less severe (open supply-side); although 
applications developed for a particular platform cannot be directly translated to 
another platform, some part of their code base, visual appearances and programming 
logic can be reused across platforms. Further, participating requires purchasing a 
license may present a barrier for some developers, even though the cost is 
substantially smaller than for closed systems in many other industries (e.g. video 
game developer licenses). Developer tools can be found free of cost for all the major 
platforms, indicating that their technological basis is relatively open. 
More specifically, a closed application platform is one owned and governed by a 
single party of authority which sets the rules for accepting, distributing and ranking 
applications entered in its system by third party developers. Closed platforms are 
often associated with proprietary, legally protected technologies [6]. Therefore, a 
closed platform dominates in its relationship to' developers; in contrast, open 
platforms set their rules based on consensus, e.g. open standards of technology, and 
can be forked3 at any time. 
In conclusion, modern mobile application platforms are somewhat a mixture of 
open and closed elements. Control is important for platforms, as history teaches 
prominent examples of failure in platform management. For example, IBM was the 
inventor of the PC market, but lost control to Microsoft – nowadays, Windows is the 
dominant PC operating system, whereas IBM has shifted its focus to consulting 
services. Another example is Atari, which was a dominant game console 
manufacturer at early 1980s. The company was unable to prevent the entry of 
opportunistic developers, flooding the market with low-quality games. This resulted 
in a “lemon’s market” in which consumers could not distinguish good titles from bad 
ones, and eventually abandoned the platform altogether [7]4). Descriptive in these 
cases is that once either side of a dual-market platform exits in sufficient quantities, 
the other side is quick to follow5. 
3 Potential conflicts: platform owner vs. developers 
In this section, we outline some potential conflicts of interest between developers and 
platform owners. The arguments are backed to some extent by the voice of the 
developer community. More specifically, the conflicts are based on observations 
made by following discussion forums in which developers share experience and 
knowledge to topics relating to platform markets. Such a source of information is rich 
in nature and can quickly reveal the general attitudes and pain points relating to the 
relationship between developers and platform owners. We acknowledged that the 
developer view is inherently biased and attempted to choose only such vocations of 
opinion that included facts or plausible experiences while excluding speculative and 
hostile arguments which displayed strong negative attitude towards the platform 
owner and therefore risk being more biased than others. 
The exhibits in Table 3 were gathered from several developer discussion forums. 
Clearly, they indicate that not all developers are satisfied by platform owners’ use of 
power. 
                                                        
3  Forking refers to creating a new project based on the original code base 
4   The original concept of “lemon’s market” originates from Akerlof (1970). 
5   Note the previous concern supply-side restrictions; demand-side restrictions exist as 
well but are not in the scope of this paper. 
Table 3.  Points of conflict / abuse of dominant position 
Point of conflict Evidence from developer communities 
should be developers own month 
1) 
Intra-platform competition 
“for every serious application developer leaving the Mac App Store, there are 50 App developers moving-in”  
 
2) 
Discriminative promotion 
"Recently, Apple changed their App Store ranking algorithm to stop ranking apps by download counts and instead use something else”  … “Apple 
has also started rejecting pay-per-install apps ('freemium' apps that request the user to install companion apps to earn in-game currency)”  
3) 
Entry prevention 
" I have made 6 builds trying to make MPlayerX pass Apple's review and I have explained why some privileges are so important for 
MPlayerX to achieve this and that features, But the answer is NO, NO, NO, NO, NO and NO.”  
“MPlayerX will lose so many features if it adopted Sandboxing, it could not load the subtitle automatically, it could not play the next 
episode for you automatically, it could not save the snapshots to the place where you want to, etc. Without those features, MPlayerX were 
just another lame Quicktime X, which I could not accept”. 
4) 
Restricted monetization models 
If Apple were a car company, they would already own the cars (the devices), and the roads (iTunes), and now they want a cut of the 
gasoline (content) money. They could certainly try, but it's up to you whether you will put up with it. 
5) 
Restricted knowledge sharing 
“The problem is that the app store does not provide any stats on the number of downloads. You can get a ranking, but that tells you 
nothing about download numbers” …  “no one (except Apple) knows exactly how the ranking algorithms work” 
6) 
Substitution 
“Apple seems to be preemptively "Sherlock-ing" their most prosperous Mac Devs about one OS version BEFORE Apple copies them” 
… “Apple has a history of driving away developers by incorporating their ideas into the bundled apps. Not many developers though... 
only those of really well thought out OS enhancements” 
7) 
Strategic technology  
selection 
Why do you think Windows and Mac are moving to an app store model? Sure, there's profit, but there wouldn't be any profit if people 
thought they were no more convenient than downloading from random websites. 
“ Isn't it obvious that platform manufacturers profit by limiting the access/content developers have to their systems? 
1) Intra-platform competition – one of the prime motivations for joining a 
platform is that the platform owner adopts the role of marketer, promoting the 
application and enabling access to a pre-existing customer base. However, the 
observation is only superficial. As soon as a critical mass of suppliers (first movers) 
have entered the market, it becomes unfeasible for the platform owner to continue 
supporting all developers in their marketing. Instead, it opts for increasing rivalry 
among participants, thereby aiming to increase quality while allowing for natural 
selection of market mechanism to determine the winners. The supporting strategy is 
limited to select providers which are willing to pay or are otherwise critical in 
strategic interest of the platform (“killer apps”). Thus, joining a platform does not 
eliminate the need for marketing but, as a result of intra-platform competition, the 
entrant is forced to find ways of differentiation and prominence, controlled by the 
platform owner. Essentially, the ore developers compete, the more this supports the 
platform owner’s goal to build high-quality offerings for consumers – for developers, 
obviously, fewer competitors would be better. 
2) Discriminative promotion – it is impossible for a platform owner to provide 
fair treatment in rankings due to the high number of entrants. Even by diving them 
into several categories, the platform owner is unable to guarantee a fair exposure to 
customers. The notable exceptions include positive discrimination of novel apps and 
other measures that secure constant and equal rotation of featured apps6. The uneven 
popularity of apps is not only reliant on their presentation in featured positions but 
their rise to that position results from other factors; then under the protection of the 
platform owner the initial success becomes a virtuous cycle. In fact, the platform 
owner optimizes its own revenue by displaying most popular applications at most 
prominent positions while encouraging developers to compete against in marketing 
activities beyond the platform. The effect of promotion shows in “jumping the shark”, 
whereupon temporary promotion brings a spike of new users, but once featured apps 
rotate, the growth will rapidly decline [8]. Therefore, it makes sense for the platform 
owner to promote by rotating apps in featured positions; this keeps many of them 
satisfied but allows none to maximize their prominence; which would be the goal of 
an individual developer. 
3) Entry prevention – apart from favoritism in promotion, the platform owner’s 
strategic interest can take the form of protectionism, preventing the entry of undesired 
applications. After a threshold of critical mass, the marginal increase in utility 
experienced by consumers does not increase substantially by additional applications 
(excluding “killer apps” which represent outliers). Therefore, the platform owner may 
enforce his selection power, labeled e.g. under quality control7, to prevent entry e.g. 
from such applications that are perceived too similar to incumbent category leaders 
(imitation). This type of protectionism can also be seen in censorship of applications 
that violate the terms of service by the platform owner, and favoring ones that have 
gained traction as a function of social diffusion. Various analyses show that platform 
owners can increase their profit by decreasing competing among participants [9]. This 
                                                        
6   However, if the rate of new apps introduces to each category is sufficiently high, it 
may be unpractical to exercise this type of discrimination – consider a user unable to find a 
popular application because the leaderboard changes each time. 
7   Quality control is only a problem when the platform owner shadows unfair filtering in 
the normal process of quality policy. 
is especially valid for saturated marketplaces, in which marginal value of newcomers 
is diminishing. 
4) Restricted monetization - it is common that developers apply a myriad of 
monetization models to maximize their profits. These may include, apart from direct 
application purchases solicited by the platform owner, in-app purchases (e.g. virtual 
goods), subscriptions, paid content and such, see e.g. [10]. However, in the case of 
monetization beyond the platform, the platform owner is cut off from the revenue 
capture. Because the platform owner is even in this case dealing with user acquisition 
and distribution tasks allocated to it, it feels violated when revenue capturing takes 
place outside. Therefore, it may attempt to prevent such activity, for example by 
disallowing applications with links to external payment providers. Keeping all 
economic activity within the platform is in the strict interest of the platform owner, as 
its returns are directly proportional to purchased applications. This naturally limits the 
available monetization models for developers, although there are exceptions. 
Facebook, for example, is running its App Center through its mobile applications; 
using its own technology to disseminate and monetize offerings. However, this is 
possible only for rare cases with strong demand-side position, so that platform owners 
cannot exclude them without harming the platform as a whole. In other cases, the 
platform owner will control the ability of participants to monetize their offerings, 
while developers would rather see unlimited options for monetization8. 
5) Restricted knowledge sharing – the platform owner may be tempted to hide 
information such as download statistics for competitive reasons. It may also prohibit 
in its terms of service (TOS) the sharing of such information, and censor this and 
other types of information sharing by developers in its information outlets, such as the 
official discussion forum. Such an activity is exhibited by cases of deleting 
unfavorable messages [example], as well as general refusal to share aggregate data on 
download and usage statistics. Naturally, platform owners use this data to improve 
their position in inter-platform competition – the alternative cost, from developer’s 
perspective, is the loss of transparency. 
6) Substitution – substitution may take place through acquisition or rivalry. As 
noted by [5], absorbing an application can provide demand-side advantages. While 
individual developers receive high payoffs in most acquisitions, rivals of such an 
application are likely to face restrictions by the platform owner as it is likely to favor 
its own application. Such a move would effectively remove competition in this 
specific sub-vertical of the application market. Another form of substitution is rivalry; 
for example, the platform owner can absorb ideas into its own offering. In inter-
platform competition, absorbing can be seen as expanding core software at the 
expense of developers contributing to the intra-platform category. Substitution 
hazards do not apply when the platform owner is explicitly not involved in the market 
in other role than the owner, which in theory guarantees a fair treatment of the joined 
developers. In other cases, it is rational for the platform owner to absorb applications 
of functionalities that are strategic in inter-platform competition, regardless of 
harming an individual developer in doing so. 
                                                        
8   However, the platform owner will support the diversification of monetization, as long 
as it takes place within the platform 
7) Strategic technology selection – developers are interested in leveraging the 
latest technology to provide the best experience for consumers. However, platform 
owners are tempted to not adopt technologies that require substantial investments, are 
not matched by competitors, or demise their own technological infrastructure. 
Eventually though, platform owners are forced to adopt technologies due to their 
rivalry; however, delaying such a decision until competitors make similar investments 
is a strategically feasible option. Obviously, the welfare loss of delayed adoption will 
be paid by consumers of applications. While most developers would enjoy the release 
of new technology, it may at times be against the platform owner’s strategic agenda. 
4 Developers solutions 
In the following table, we outline some prominent solutions developers can opt for to 
reduce their risk and increase their bargaining positions in regards to the platform 
owner. 
 
table 4 
A) Custom development - the developer may aim to enjoy the application hype 
indirectly by leveraging his skill to develop applications for others in exchange for 
payment, in effect leveraging hype externalities. In this model, the client assumes the 
risk of failure while returns for developer are guaranteed. This effectively solves the 
problem of limited monetization opportunities because the developer is free to choose 
his monetization model. Further, to enhance his position, the developer can pursue 
contractual revenue sharing, in which case he would exchange a part of his 
compensation for eventual scale returns of the client’s ‘killer app’. Therefore, 
according to his risk tolerance the developer can apply a mixed revenue model. By 
capturing hype externalities, the developer is also able to hone his skills, regardless of 
the technology stack offered by the platform owner. This is beneficial in cases of 
strategic technology selection. The natural consequence is that it tends to increase the 
amount of information pertaining to the focal topic. In other words, hype effects can 
be used by the developer to benefit from knowledge sharing and to increase their 
skills. 
B) Diversification (multi-homing) - A common and fairly straight-forward 
strategy is diversification, also sometimes called multi-homing or multi-platform 
strategy, in which the developer offers applications in several platforms, thereby 
reducing his dependence on a single source of revenue, and also extending his 
repertoire for monetizing. In a case of rejection from one platform, the developer is 
free to apply elsewhere. The negative effects include additional labor required to 
adapt the software to several platforms, and duplicating potential within platform 
marketing efforts. However, beyond-platform marketing is synergistic as long as only 
the platform (not application) changes, and there is learning overlap in developing for 
several mobile platforms. The major disadvantage of the method is of course the need 
for investing into several development projects – although there are potential 
development synergies between platforms, developers may consider possible 
differences in user bases and other characteristics of the market (e.g. purchase 
willingness; ratio of paid and non-paid applications, etc.).Diversification also gives 
access to various technological infrastructures, bypassing platform owner’s strategic 
technology selection. Further, it protects against substitution; when substitution takes 
place, the developer shifts his focus over to others. However, diversification will not 
solve intra-platform competition because in each platform he enters, the developer 
finds new rivals. Large developers are able to diversify titles to increase the likelihood 
of creating hits, while a small developer has to succeed with fewer attempts. 
C) Brand building - strong branding increases the potential of becoming a ‘killer 
app’, followed by additional support from the platform owner. Brands are an effective 
means to distinguish from the competition, and they may be under-exploited by 
technologically oriented founders. A recent example of a successful branding strategy 
includes Rovio’s Angry Birds that has spun off to a tremendous number of product 
categories not related to technology at all. A strong brand can act as a shield against 
substitution; it is harder to replicate than functionalities – allowing, and in fact 
encouraging the birth of ‘killer apps’ is a stronger goal for the platform owner than 
recreating or absorbing them1. Thus, branding not only offers means to differentiate 
in intra-platform competition but also to pre-empt substitution threats to a major 
degree. In addition, the platform owner is unlikely to exclude entrants from branded 
applications9. When brand building efforts take place outside the platform, a 
developer is able to circumvent the platform owner’s discriminative marketing. 
D) Cross-promotion - an example of within-platform marketing, cross-promotion 
typically operate in “tit-for-tat” fashion; in other words, one referred user from 
application A to application B earns one back in exchange. Through technological 
mediation such activities can be coordinated efficiently, as proven by the Facebook 
application ‘Applifier’ which reached over 55 million developer-users within its first 
ten months. Indeed, cross-promotion is a means of turning around the intra-platform 
competition; instead of being eaten away by each other, developers may share users; 
although it is vulnerable to the same power law dynamics than regular application 
rankings/listings10, it presents an alternative to the market mechanism provided by the 
platform owner, reducing the negative effects of discriminative marketing. 
E) Syndication - finally, developers may discriminate abusive platform owners 
and promote their misdeeds to other developers. Because the platform owner is 
dependent on developers as a collective unit, the response of abuse should also take a 
collective form. E.g. protest, bans, and such are means that can be used to generate 
negative press for the platform owner and pressure it to increase transparency and fair 
policies. Thereby, harnessing ‘group power’ in an organized means would produce 
better outcomes than atomistic complaints. For example, developer communities are a 
natural means for online re-grouping, and a substantial part of knowledge sharing 
takes place inside them. By syndicating, developers are also able to communicate 
claims regarding to the future development of the platform’s technology stack, 
                                                        
9   However, it will exclude those aiming to leverage the platform owner’s brand, e.g. 
iTunz and similar variations are not allowed in Apple’s App Store. 
10  The more is share, the more is received; this favors a winner-take-all structures, as the 
most popular applications are accounting for most shared traffic. Some means to normalize 
distribution include thematic inclusion (in which only thematically relevant applications are 
shown to the user); and limited entry (naturally not all developers are joining cross-
promotion systems, which gives those who join some advantage over them). 
thereby influencing the strategic behavior of the platform owner. If the platform 
owner remains ignorant to organized requests by the developer community, it risks 
losing popularity – therefore, syndication signals credible threats. Syndication can 
also protect from intra-platform competition; instead of competing against each other, 
developers may share resources and skills according to formalized agreements. At the 
same time, the platform owner may find it more difficult to substitute syndication as 
oppose to single developer. 
F) Creating network effects – the structure of application markets supports 
network effects e.g. [7]. In one sided markets, network effects relate to growing the 
homogeneous user-base: classical examples include railroads and telephone lines: the 
more they have coverage, the more it makes sense to use them in various situations. In 
dual sided markets, the user groups are heterogeneous and typically complementing 
one another, e.g. men and women in a dating application, or buyers and sellers in a 
marketplace. Harnessing network effects enables an application to bypass the within-
platform marketing; typically they spread outside the platform as a function of word-
of-mouth or other forms of peer-marketing; independent from the existence of the 
platform as a marketing channel, but dependent on it as a distribution channel. Such a 
situation effectively solves the conflict of interests: the platform owner is not required 
to use resources for marketing, the developer is not dependent on the ranking effects 
within a platform, and both earn revenue according to the set revenue-sharing scheme. 
Further, network effects protect against substitution – the platform owner may more 
easily replicate the functionality of an application than its user base. This can be seen 
in many cases of acquisitions, in which a fairly simple application is acquired due to 
its enormous user base11.Network effects are a natural means of solving intra-platform 
competition; since they reach beyond the platform, the developer is able to draw 
support from outside, as opposed to being vulnerable to the platform owner’s 
discriminative promotion tactics. 
Conclusions and discussion 
In conclusion, the conflicts are the result of power imbalance in distribution and 
marketing of applications. Discriminating between applications is a strategy that the 
platform owner can use to maximize its revenues. Further, by creating a winner-take-
all structure in its categories, it can enhance the reference point effect, i.e. creation of 
killer apps that media is more likely to cover and newcomers are likely to see as their 
role models. In an increasingly competitive application market, the lack of 
transparency reduces developers’ ability to make just decisions. For example, the role 
of marketing agencies in increasing the ranking of applications either legitimately 
(e.g. negotiating with Apple to increase ranking to featured position) or by fraudulent 
measures (e.g. fake ratings, downloads) not only place developers in unequal 
positions but disrupt the market mechanism in determining which applications receive 
most prominence. These issues are no different from classical economic arguments 
against non-centralized decision making e.g. [11]; thereby revealing the rating 
                                                        
11  Such would be e.g. the acquisition of Instagram by Facebook. 
mechanisms, and if necessary altering them closer to market-driven demand would be 
a reassuring signal from the platform owners to alleviate the uncertainty faced by 
developers. In any case, developers are sensitive to structural changes by the platform 
owner; for example, when Facebook changed its ranking algorithm for Application 
Directory, to prefer usage over the number of downloads, the change lead developers 
to favor greater interactivity in their apps [7]. 
Finally, the observation also formulates a strategic guideline for developers 
looking to monetize the growing app markets: finding and entering sub-categories 
without a leader can produce escalating rents intensified by the platform owner’s 
protection. However, as the platform market matures, so do various sub-categories, 
and it becomes increasingly difficult to find new ones. There are strong basis to argue 
for “fool’s gold” phenomenon when entering in a saturated category with little ability 
to differentiate against category leaders. In conclusion, we have presented several 
potential conflict areas between platform owners and developers, as well as offered 
some prominent solutions as a strategic course of action for developers. It must be 
noted that both parties act according to their own interest, and the conflict of interests 
is therefore a natural outcome. Under this premise, the platform owner is interested in 
protection of its business interests while the developer wishes to maximize his share 
of revenue in the collaboration consisting of development, distribution and 
monetizing applications. In a mixture of economic and non-economic motives, 
however, gains of purely profit-oriented agents are somewhat diluted – this happens 
because consumers choose the cheaper option which satisfies their minimum 
requirements [12], while some fraction of developers is more interested in other 
effects of popularity rather than revenue; yet competing in the same platform. 
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